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1 Introduction
As shown in Baum-Snow and Pavan [2012], US wages were more than 30
percent higher in metropolitan areas with over 1.5 million inhabitants than
in rural areas in the year 2000. Furthermore, their model indicates that
ability sorting and returns to experience across locations are crucial elements
in explaining the wage premium in large cities. Glaeser and Mare [2001] show
that sorting on human capital accounts for about one-third of the city-size
wage gap in the US. Moreover, Gould [2007] demonstrates that migration of
high-skill workers is important in justifying the urban productivity premium,
that is amplified by steeper experience profiles in urban areas. These analyses
suggest that workers signal their skill and experience using their locations,
which yields the urban wage premium.
Households’ private information includes their productivity, which varies
among individuals. When locations can possibly reveal workers’ productiv-
ities, it is natural to ask why in practice some locations are attached to a
signal for high productivity of workers, while others are not. For example,
fashion designers in Milan, software programmers in Seattle, entertainers in
Hollywood, financiers on Wall Street, or high-tech workers in Silicon Valley
can be viewed as having a higher productivity than do workers in the same
field in other locations. These observations could be due to learning from
other workers, or interaction with R&D in these locations; however, they
could also be due to a locational signaling effect. Many tools are used to sig-
nal workers’ abilities since information about workers’ skill is very important
to firms and workers, for example: college diplomas, professional certificates,
and academic alliance memberships.1 It is interesting to examine how high-
skill workers can use locational agglomeration to distinguish themselves from
other workers, and how effective location can be as a reference for workers’
1In urban economics, for example, there is the UEA.
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productivity.2
Berliant and Kung [2010] analyze how asymmetric information causes ag-
glomeration. Using a screening model, they show that workers can agglomer-
ate and be sorted by skill in equilibrium due to asymmetric information in the
labor market. Though it seems intuitive that both signaling and screening
can explain sorting by human capital and the significant wage premium in
large cities, one major difference between them is in the equilibrium sorting
patterns: In the screening model, since contracts are offered first, separation
of types by contract instead of location can occur, and thus, any distribution
of workers constitutes an equilibrium. Even considering stability, equilibrium
patterns are not narrowed down much. In contrast, for the signaling model,
separation of types can only occur by choice of location, not by choice of
contract. Thus, equilibrium narrows things down quite a bit. This paper
answers the question: When there is asymmetric information, does strat-
ification emerge in equilibrium due to the signaling value of the choice of
location? The shadow cost of location, and thus of the signal, is the price of
housing in a region.
Krugman [1991a] and New Economic Geography (NEG) models adopt in-
creasing returns to scale to explain the agglomeration of manufacturing firms
in one region. When transportation cost is decreased as transportation tech-
nology is improved, a core-periphery pattern is more likely in equilibrium.
Many economic agglomeration phenomena in reality cannot be satisfactorily
explained by increasing returns to scale. That is, there is a need to offer eco-
nomic explanations other than increasing returns to scale in explaining the
agglomeration of industries without increasing returns. A signaling incentive
2McGuire [1974] advocates the importance of studies of economic reasons for voluntary
segregation. Glaeser and Saiz [2004] also examine the incentives for people to agglomer-
ate around high-skill workers. They find three reasons for agglomeration that they call
the consumer city view, the information city view, and the reinvention city view. Our
locational signaling viewpoint can be a fourth reason.
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potentially fills this need. It is natural to ask: Is a core-periphery configu-
ration more likely to constitute an equilibrium when there are no increasing
returns to scale in production, but rather asymmetric information?
In contrast to aggregate uncertainty discussed in Berliant and Yu [2013],
idiosyncratic uncertainty (individual-specific information) is the source of
asymmetric information in this paper. A model with two regions and two
types of workers, with high and low productivity, is analyzed. Workers are
mobile across regions whereas differences in regional wages and housing rents
determine their migration incentives. We examine under what conditions
the equilibrium distribution of workers would be stratified. When workers’
marginal willingness to pay for housing is negatively correlated with their
productivity, there are at least three equilibria: a completely symmetric equi-
librium where both types of workers are evenly distributed over both regions,
and two partially stratified equilibria (or say core-periphery equilibria) where
high-productivity workers are agglomerated in one region, but low skill work-
ers are not. The completely symmetric equilibrium is unstable whereas the
partially stratified equilibria are stable. In contrast, when workers’ marginal
willingness to pay for housing is positively correlated with workers’ produc-
tivity, there always exists a completely symmetric equilibrium but there are
no core-periphery equilibria. The completely symmetric equilibrium is stable
when the difference in workers’ productivities is not large. When the differ-
ence in productivities is very large, the completely symmetric equilibrium is
unstable.
Though a higher wage for workers in the fashion industry in Milan attracts
workers in an alternative region to migrate to Milan, due to a larger aggregate
housing demand, in equilibrium there will be a higher housing rent in Mi-
lan to offset workers’ migration incentives. When high-productivity workers
have a lower marginal willingness to pay for housing than low-productivity
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workers, the signaling cost for high-productivity workers is lower than that
for low-productivity workers at the core-periphery equilibrium. Therefore,
for a given wage premium in Milan, there is a long-run stratified equilib-
rium such that all the high-productivity workers agglomerate in Milan while
the low-productivity workers reside in both Milan and the alternative re-
gion. When high-productivity workers have a higher marginal willingness to
pay for housing than low-productivity workers, the signaling cost for high-
productivity workers is higher than that for low-productivity workers under
any core-periphery configuration. This intuition is verified in this paper,
which suggests a potentially testable implication of our model, namely the
prevalence of agglomeration of high-skill workers as a function of the corre-
lation of skill and marginal willingness to pay for housing.
Notice that, in either a stratified or a symmetric equilibrium, no region
is fully occupied by high-productivity workers alone. That is, there is no
completely stratified equilibrium, but a semi-pooled equilibrium may exist.3
Therefore, it is only possible to ensure that any worker who does not reside
in Milan is a low-productivity worker. For every worker in Milan, it is im-
possible to guarantee that his/her productivity is high in any equilibrium.
This observation indicates that location is at best an approximate instead of
a precise sieve for high-productivity workers.
Furthermore, if we consider a continuous increase in high-skill workers’
productivity relative to that of low-skill workers, a core-periphery equilibrium
is present, even if there are no increasing returns to scale in production and
knowledge spillovers. In other words, the agglomeration of high-productivity
industries can be attributed to the existence of a locational signaling effect.
Since, intuitively, increasing returns to scale in fashion design seems bizarre,
3The core-periphery equilibrium in this paper corresponds to a semi-pooling equilibrium
where some types of senders choose the same signal (location) and other types choose
different signals (locations).
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the agglomeration of fashion industries in Milan can be explained from a
signaling viewpoint.4
Signaling cost in our model is determined by housing prices, and housing
prices are different for different distributions of workers. In contrast with
most signaling models where the marginal signaling cost is exogenous, i.e.,
Spence [1973], Wilson [1977], Grossman [1981], and Rothschild and Stiglitz
[1976], the marginal signaling cost is endogenous in our paper. That is,
signaling cost affects workers’ migration incentives, and after their migration,
the distribution of workers’ types further influences the signaling cost.5 We
explore the question: Does the interaction between migration and marginal
signaling cost yield a stratified equilibrium? The same type of endogeneity
holds in cheap-talk models like Crawford and Sobel [1982] and Austen-Smith
and Banks [2000].
In what follows, our model is introduced in Section 2. Moreover, nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stable core-periphery
equilibria and for the stability of integrated equilibria are presented. Analyt-
ical equilibrium analysis and related welfare analyses are offered in Section
3. Conclusions are in Section 4. An appendix contains the proof of the main
result.
4We do not claim that all agglomerations of high skill workers result from signaling.
Our view is much more modest, that signaling can be a contributing factor.
5The feature that the marginal signaling cost is endogenously determined by housing
market clearing is in contrast to Fang’s [2001] settings. This feature allows us to examine
whether the market mechanism helps or hinders private information revelation. In ad-
dition, Fang adopts the Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept, whereas a stability concept
is employed in our model (common in the spatial economics literature). Since we don’t
have an informational free-riding problem, the completely symmetric equilibrium is always
Pareto optimal, whereas in Fang’s model parameters are chosen so that an asymmetric
equilibrium is efficient.
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2 Model
There are two regions k ∈ K ≡ {x, y} with the same land endowment s¯.
There are two types of mobile workers i ∈ N ≡ {H,L} with exogenous
populations nH , nL ∈ R++, respectively, where the productivity of H-type
workers is higher than that of L-type workers. H-type (L-type) workers can
be interpreted as high-skill (low-skill) workers, or can be interpreted as ex-
perienced (novice) workers. With the second interpretation, the appearance
of a stratified equilibrium implies that returns to experience are important
in explaining the city size wage premium.
Throughout this paper, workers’ type is indexed by a superscript and
location is indexed by a subscript. The (endogenous) population of i-type
workers living in k is denoted by nik, and the (exogenous) aggregate popula-
tion in the model is n = nH + nL. Firms cannot recognize any worker’s type
directly; however, firms know the (equilibrium) distribution of workers’ types
over the two regions and can infer the probability of a worker’s type using
his/her location. Utility is quasilinear. Let sik, z
i
k be each i-type worker’s
house size and the consumption of composite goods in region k, i ∈ N , k ∈ K,
respectively. Let rk denote the rent per unit of housing and let wk denote the
worker’s wage in k, k ∈ K. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor.
There is no disutility from work, and composite good has price 1. The rents
are collected and consumed by households, each of whom is endowed with eik
units of housing in k, i ∈ N , k ∈ K. Notice that nHeHk + nLeLk = s¯, k ∈ K.
Letting ϕik ≡ (sik, zik), i ∈ N , k ∈ K, the optimization problem for H-type
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workers in region k, k ∈ K, is6
max uHk (ϕ
H
k ) = z
H
k −
α
sHk
s.t. rk s
H
k + z
H
k ≤ wk + rx eHx + ry eHy , (1)
sHk , z
H
k ∈ R+;
whereas the optimization problem for L-type workers in k is
max uLk (ϕ
L
k ) = z
L
k −
β
sLk
s.t. rk s
L
k + z
L
k ≤ wk + rx eLx + ry eLy , (2)
sLk , z
L
k ∈ R+.
Assume that α, β > 0. Either α > β holds, which implies that workers’
demand for housing is positively correlated with productivity, or α < β holds,
implying that workers’ demand for housing and productivity are negatively
correlated, depicted in Figures 1 and 2.7 This is the analog of the single
crossing property that is used in signaling models.
To simplify the analysis, assume that each worker inelastically supplies
one unit of labor, so we need not be concerned about monitoring and vol-
untary participation constraints. Every firm hires one worker at most. Each
firm can adopt a high type technology together with a H-type labor to pro-
duce Y H , or adopt a low type technology together with a L-type labor to
produce Y L, where 0 < Y L < Y H . The corresponding profit in k is Y H −wk
6Except for asymmetric information, our model satisfies all the assumptions of Star-
rett’s [1978] theorem. That is, asymmetric information is the only source of agglomeration
in this model.
7When α = β, the signaling cost is the same for both types of workers who thus have
the same migration incentive. Then, one of two cases occur. Either H-type workers want
to agglomerate in one region in equilibrium, in which case L-types want to agglomerate in
the same region, and thus, the land market in the other region cannot clear. Or H-type
workers do not want to agglomerate in any region, in which case for any given distribution
of H-type workers over the two regions, there exists a distribution of L-type workers which
can constitute an equilibrium. That is, given α = β, either there are an infinite number
of equilibria or there is no long-run equilibrium, which is not a case of interest.
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and Y L − wk, respectively, k ∈ K. When any firm adopts a high type tech-
nology with a L-type worker, the output is zero. On the other hand, when a
firm adopts a low type technology with a H-type worker, the output is Y L,
which is lower than Y H . That is, no firm would prefer to adopt a technology
that is incompatible with the type of the hired worker. Firms maximize their
expected profit; their equilibrium behavior in choosing technology will be ex-
plained later. Every firm or worker is so small that he/she cannot influence
competitive market prices. Furthermore, assume that there is free entry of
firms, and thus, every firm earns zero expected profit in equilibrium. Finally,
workers choose locations to maximize their utilities, including the considera-
tion that firms can possibly learn about workers’ types only from observing
their locations.8
To extract the influence of signaling effects, assume that there is no com-
muting; that is, workers can work only in the place where they live. In other
words, this is a regional, not city, model. However, H-type and L-type work-
ers are allowed to migrate to earn a higher utility.9 Denote ρH (ρL) as the
ratio of H-type (L-type) workers in the world living in x, and thus 1 − ρH
(1− ρL) is the ratio of all H-type (L-type) workers living in y. The popula-
tion in x and y, given (ρH , ρL), can be expressed as nx ≡ ρHnH + ρLnL and
ny ≡ (1− ρH)nH + (1− ρL)nL, respectively.
To characterize locational signaling effects, the market process is given as
follows. First, each firm hires a worker without knowing his/her productivity.
Though firms do not know each worker’s type, suppose that firms do not
misperceive; that is, they know the actual equilibrium proportion of H-type
workers in each region and thus have a common distribution over a worker’s
type conditional on his/her equilibrium location. Then, since there is free
8Since agents are competitive in the housing market, they cannot do anything to attract
workers and increase their housing rental income.
9When H-type workers are mobile but L-type workers are immobile, there are similar
results.
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entry of firms, each firm in a region pays its worker a wage according to
the expected profit in the region. After learning the type of worker that the
firm hires, the firm chooses its production technology to maximize ex post
profit or minimize ex post loss. A mixed adoption of technology is assumed
not available for firms. The above assumptions are standard in labor-market
models of adverse selection, particularly that of Greenwald [1986].10
Note that given (ρH , ρL), since there is free entry of firms, each firm earns
zero expected profit. Thus, the wages for every worker in region x and y
are11
wx(ρ
H , ρL) =
1
nx
(ρHnHY H + ρLnLY L), (3)
wy(ρ
H , ρL) =
1
ny
[(1− ρH)nHY H + (1− ρL)nLY L]. (4)
Let us temporarily leave workers’ mobility aside. Short-run equilibrium is
defined as a competitive market equilibrium, given a population distribution
over the two regions.
Definition 1 (Short-Run Equilibrium)
(ϕH∗k , ϕ
L∗
k , w
∗
k, r
∗
k)k∈K constitutes a short-run equilibrium if, given an arbitrary
10Surely, changing the specified market process can change the results of our model.
For example, when firms are assumed to choose their technology before knowing workers’
type, the chosen technology must be the same for all firms in one region (since there is no
difference between firms in the same region). Moreover, given workers’ distribution is not
completely symmetric, when the high technology is chosen in one region in equilibrium,
the other region will choose the low technology. Since the H-type (L-type) workers can be
hired only in the region adopting the high (low) technology, a core-periphery equilibrium is
immediate for any not-completely symmetric initial distribution of workers. Actually, this
setting is more like a screening model as analyzed in Berliant and Kung [2010], instead
of a signaling model. In addition, when firms pay the wage after they know workers’
type, there is no need for workers to use locational signaling. Therefore, the market
process specified here is more appropriate in presenting a story for signaling effects than
alternative assumptions.
11The main purpose of this paper is to characterize agglomeration across regions, instead
of migration within one region; therefore, wage inequality within the same region is not
considered here. Both inequality across and within regions can be explained by a variation
of this model.
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(ρH , ρL), workers choose optimal consumptions, firms make competitive wage
offers for the distribution of workers, and the housing and the composite good
markets in each region clear. That is:
(a) uik(ϕ
i∗
k ) ≥ uik(ϕik), for all ϕik ∈ R2+ satisfying rk sik+zik ≤ wk+rxeix+ryeiy,
∀i ∈ N ,
k ∈ K;
(b) w∗x =
1
nx
(ρHnHY H + ρLnLY L), and
w∗y =
1
ny
[(1− ρH)nHY H + (1− ρL)nLY L];
(c) ρH nH sH∗x + ρ
L nL sL∗x = s¯,
(1− ρH)nH sH∗y + (1− ρL)nL sL∗y = s¯,
(ρH zH∗x + (1− ρH) zH∗y )nH + (ρL zL∗x + (1− ρL) zL∗y )nL
= nH Y H + nL Y L.
The short-run equilibrium, by Walras’ law, is determined by conditions
(a), (b), and the first two (or any two) equalities in (c). Recalling that
nx ≡ ρHnH + ρLnL and ny ≡ (1 − ρH)nH + (1 − ρL)nL, and letting Yx ≡
ρHnHY H + ρLnLY L and Yy ≡ (1 − ρH)nHY H + (1 − ρL)nLY L, Theorem 1
shows that the short-run equilibrium exists and is unique.
Theorem 1 For each (ρH , ρL) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1], there exists a unique short-run
equilibrium, where
sH∗x =
√
αs¯√
αρHnH +
√
βρLnL
, sH∗y =
√
αs¯√
α(1− ρH)nH +√β(1− ρL)nL , (5)
sL∗x =
√
βs¯√
αρHnH +
√
βρLnL
, sL∗y =
√
βs¯√
α(1− ρH)nH +√β(1− ρL)nL , (6)
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zH∗x =
eHx (
√
αρHnH +
√
βρLnL)2
s¯2
+
eHy (
√
α(1− ρH)nH +√β(1− ρL)nL)2
s¯2
+
Yx
nx
− αρ
HnH +
√
αβρLnL
s¯
, (7)
zH∗y =
eHx (
√
αρHnH +
√
βρLnL)2
s¯2
+
eHy (
√
α(1− ρH)nH +√β(1− ρL)nL)2
s¯2
+
Yy
ny
− α(1− ρ
H)nH +
√
αβ(1− ρL)nL
s¯
, (8)
zL∗x =
eHx (
√
αρHnH +
√
βρLnL)2
s¯2
+
eHy (
√
α(1− ρH)nH +√β(1− ρL)nL)2
s¯2
+
Yx
nx
− βρ
LnL +
√
αβρHnH
s¯
, (9)
zL∗y =
eHx (
√
αρHnH +
√
βρLnL)2
s¯2
+
eHy (
√
α(1− ρH)nH +√β(1− ρL)nL)2
s¯2
+
Yy
ny
− β(1− ρ
L)nL +
√
αβ(1− ρH)nH
s¯
, (10)
w∗x =
Yx
nx
, w∗y =
Yy
ny
, r∗x =
(√
αρHnH +
√
βρLnL
s¯
)2
, and (11)
r∗y =
(√
α(1− ρH)nH +√β(1− ρL)nL
s¯
)2
. (12)
Proof. Firms’ free-entry condition gives equilibrium wages. Substituting w∗k
into workers’ utility maximization problems (1) and (2), workers’ optimal
consumptions are functions of (rk)k∈K and (ρH , ρL); the equilibrium housing
prices can be solved by substituting demands into market clearing conditions.
Finally, equilibrium consumption is found by substituting equilibrium prices
into demand functions. Q.E.D.
Based on the indirect utility functions derived from the short-run equilib-
rium given above, the long-run equilibrium of this model and related welfare
implications are analyzed in the next section.
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3 Signaling Equilibrium and Welfare Analy-
sis
When workers’ mobility is considered, workers have to choose their optimal
locations according to the utilities from living in the two regions. Since i-type
workers’ indirect utility from living in region k is uik(ϕ
i∗
k ), i ∈ N , k ∈ K, the
equilibrium condition for no further migration is
uix(ϕ
i∗
x ) = u
i
y(ϕ
i∗
y ), if ρ
i∗ ∈ (0, 1), ∀ i ∈ N. (13)
However, when all i-type workers are agglomerated in region k, i ∈ N , k ∈
K, i-type workers’ utility in the other region k′, k′ ∈ K where k′ 6= k, is
not defined. Following the literature, the potential wage and housing rent
for i-type workers in k′ is defined as the limit of the equilibrium wage and
equilibrium rent in k′ when the number of i-type workers in k′ approaches
zero. So the potential utility for i-type workers in k′ is defined according
to their potential wage and potential housing rent in k′. Given this setting,
the signaling equilibrium concept is in fact defined by a pair (ρH∗, ρL∗) ∈
[0, 1] × [0, 1], and the corresponding (ϕH∗k , ϕL∗k , w∗k, r∗k)k∈K that satisfy the
following conditions.
Definition 2 (Signaling Equilibrium)
((ϕH∗k , ϕ
L∗
k , w
∗
k, r
∗
k)k∈K , ρ
H∗, ρL∗) constitutes a signaling equilibrium if and only
if (ϕH∗k , ϕ
L∗
k , w
∗
k, r
∗
k)k∈K constitutes a short-run equilibrium for (ρ
H∗, ρL∗),
and, in addition, no worker in any region has an incentive to migrate to
the other region. That is, in addition to conditions (a)-(c) in Definition 1,
it is required that12
(d) uix(ϕ
i∗
x ) = u
i
y(ϕ
i∗
y ) if ρ
i∗ ∈ (0, 1), ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K;
uHx (ϕ
H∗
x ) > limρH→1 u
H
y (ϕ
H
y [ry(ρ
H , ρL∗), wy(ρH , ρL∗)]), if ρH∗ = 1;
12It is assumed that there is a small positive installation cost when a household is the
first one to live in a region with no other resident. Therefore, when any inequality in
condition (d) holds with equality, households still have an incentive not to migrate into
an empty region.
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uLx (ϕ
L∗
x ) > limρL→1 u
L
y (ϕ
L
y [ry(ρ
H∗, ρL), wy(ρH∗, ρL)]), if ρL∗ = 1;
uHy (ϕ
H∗
y ) > limρH→0 u
H
x (ϕ
H
x [rx(ρ
H , ρL∗), wx(ρH , ρL∗)]), if ρH∗ = 0;
uLy (ϕ
L∗
y ) > limρL→0 u
L
x (ϕ
L
x [rx(ρ
H∗, ρL), wx(ρH∗, ρL)]), if ρL∗ = 0.
The long-run signaling equilibrium can be found as a solution to the
system of equations including (a), (b), (d), and, by Walras’ Law, the first
two equations of condition (c) in Definition 1. More specifically, recall that
the equilibrium consumption and prices are functions of (ρH , ρL) as shown in
Theorem 1. Substituting equilibrium consumption into the utility functions,
we have workers’ difference in indirect utilities from living in the regions,
given a distribution of workers. Letting ui∗k = u
i
k(ϕ
i∗
k ), it can be checked that
uH∗x − uH∗y = w∗x − w∗y − 2
√
α(
√
r∗x −
√
r∗y), (14)
uL∗x − uL∗y = w∗x − w∗y − 2
√
β(
√
r∗x −
√
r∗y). (15)
Notice that w∗x − w∗y is interpreted as a signaling gain (if it is positive), or
signaling loss (if it is negative) from living in x compared to living in y, which
is the same for both types of workers. On the other hand, the signaling cost
of living in x relative to living in y is 2
√
α(
√
r∗x−
√
r∗y) and 2
√
β(
√
r∗x−
√
r∗y)
for H-type and L-type workers, respectively. When α < β, if r∗x > r
∗
y, the
signaling cost for high-skill workers is smaller than that for low-skill workers,
indicating that there should exist stratified equilibria. On the other hand,
when α > β and r∗x > r
∗
y, there should exist no stratified equilibrium.
Signaling equilibrium is a solution to the system of simultaneous nonlinear
equations (14) and (15). It is interesting to notice that if (ρH∗, ρL∗) = (1
2
, 1
2
)
constitutes an equilibrium, the result is exactly the case where both types
of workers are equally distributed over the two regions, which is called a
completely symmetric equilibrium; whereas if either (ρH∗, ρL∗) = (1, 0) or
(ρH∗, ρL∗) = (0, 1) in equilibrium, there is a completely stratified equilib-
rium.13 Letting f ≡ uH∗x − uH∗y and g ≡ uL∗x − uL∗y , the following lemma
13We are more interested in partially stratified equilibria.
13
ensures the existence of an interior equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Equal-dispersion (ρH∗, ρL∗) = (1
2
, 1
2
) always constitutes a signal-
ing equilibrium.
Proof. Given (ρH , ρL) = (1
2
, 1
2
), it is obvious that w∗x = w
∗
y and r
∗
x = r
∗
y, which
implies f = 0 and g = 0. Therefore, (ρH∗, ρL∗) = (1
2
, 1
2
) is always one of the
solutions to uH∗x = u
H∗
y and u
L∗
x = u
L∗
y . Q.E.D.
In addition to the existence of a signaling equilibrium, the stability of a
long-run equilibrium should be examined. For a given (ρH , ρL) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
and the corresponding equilibrium utility levels (ui∗x , u
i∗
y ), i ∈ N , we consider
standard dynamics with multiple types of workers. When ui∗x > u
i∗
y (u
i∗
x <
ui∗y ), i ∈ N , i-type workers in y (x) surely have incentive to move to x (y).
In order to explore the stability of signaling equilibria, following Krugman
[1991b], Fukao and Benabou [1993], and Forslid and Ottaviano [2003], for
i ∈ N , let ρ˙i describe the ad hoc dynamics:
ρ˙i ≡ dρ
i
dt
=

max{0, γ (ui∗x − ui∗y )} if ρi = 0,
γ (ui∗x − ui∗y ) if ρi ∈ (0, 1),
min{0, γ (ui∗x − ui∗y )} if ρi = 1.
(16)
Notice that γ > 0 represents a measure of the speed of adjustment in the
ratio of i-type workers across regions, i ∈ N (as emphasized in Krugman
[1991b], “γ is an inverse index of the cost of adjustment”). That is, when
ui∗x > u
i∗
y (u
i∗
x < u
i∗
y ), i-type workers in y (x) migrate to x (y) with a speed
of |ρ˙i|.
If there is a small perturbation such that in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
a new short-run equilibrium is attained where firms have rational expecta-
tions, then the signaling equilibrium is unstable. Otherwise, the signaling
equilibrium is stable. The definition of stability of an equilibrium is formally
given as follows.
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Definition 3 (Stability of Equilibrium)
For any small perturbation of workers from the equilibrium worker distribu-
tion, given that firms can only recognize a worker’s type according to their
beliefs in the new short-run equilibrium, if the utility difference from living in
different locations drives the perturbed workers back to their equilibrium lo-
cation, the equilibrium is stable; otherwise, the equilibrium is called unstable.
Note that, given condition (d) in Definition 2, a core-periphery configu-
ration (i.e, ρH∗ = 0 or ρH∗ = 1) is always a stable equilibrium when it con-
stitutes an equilibrium. However, a completely symmetric equilibrium can
be stable or unstable. Intuitively, when ρH increases, fixing ρL and all pa-
rameters, since the population in x (y) increases (decreases), the demand for
and thus the equilibrium price of houses in x (y) increases (decreases) and at
the same time, the average productivity or wage of workers in x (y) increases
(decreases). Therefore, ui∗x − ui∗y , i ∈ N , may not be a monotonic function
of ρH . On the other hand, given ρH and parameters, when ρL increases, the
demand for housing in x increases and the average productivity of workers
in x decreases. That is, there is no benefit but only damage for any resident
in x when there are low-skill migrants coming from y, so ui∗x − ui∗y , i ∈ N , is
monotonically decreasing in ρL. Notice that the signaling gain is the same for
both types of workers in the same region. As illustrated in Figure 3, when
the marginal willingness to pay for housing for H-type workers is smaller
than that for L-type workers, the signaling cost for H-type workers is less
than the signaling cost for L-type workers at the core-periphery equilibrium,
and thus, H-type workers have a stronger incentive to migrate to the region
with a higher wage, which causes an agglomeration of H-type workers in the
ex post core region. By contrast, in Figure 4, when the marginal willingness
to pay for housing for H-type workers is larger than that for L-type workers,
the signaling cost for H-type workers is higher than the signaling cost for
L-type workers. In this case, there is no equilibrium with an agglomeration
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of any type of worker. Though there is no closed-form solution for the simul-
taneous equations ui∗x = u
i∗
y , i ∈ N , in the interesting cases with nH < nL,
the intuition above is verified by the following proposition and depicted in
Figures 5 and 6.
Theorem 2 Given nH < nL, when α < β, there always exist a symmetric
equilibrium and two stable core-periphery equilibria with ρH∗ = 0 or ρH∗ = 1;
when α > β, there is no core-periphery equilibrium, but only a symmetric
equilibrium which is stable if and only if Y H ≤ Y L + αn2
s¯ nL
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The wage in the core is higher than that in the periphery in any core-
periphery equilibrium. That is, the urban wage premium can be explained
by locational signals in productivity.
The intuition behind why there is no completely separating equilibrium
in the case where β > α is as follows. If the high productivity types were
separated from the low productivity types, then low productivity types will
want to join them because wage is higher in their location whereas housing
cost is lower. We conjecture that the idea that the low productivity workers
chase the high productivity workers extends to more general models, with
more types of workers and more locations.
Since there are no increasing returns to scale in production and no ag-
glomeration spillovers, the agglomeration of any type of worker in this model
contributes nothing to production. To see this, notice that with no private
information, equilibrium is first best and features equal land rent in the two
regions, implying equal marginal willingness to pay for land for all consumers.
With private information, among the various equilibria, only completely sym-
metric equilibria feature equal land rents in the two regions, and thus only
they can be first best (but might not be, due to the information asymme-
tries). That is, households’ use of resources for signaling is unproductive and
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distorts housing prices.
The core-periphery equilibrium is apparently an example of what Spence
calls the “hybrid equilibrium.” However, it is interesting to notice that when
the signaling cost is endogenized by the housing market, the completely sep-
arating equilibrium is ruled out. That is, this paper implies that considering
market mechanisms may help in the selection from multiple equilibria.
Notice also that the belief of workers’ type is not arbitrarily given (for
example, when ρH = 0 and one H-type worker migrates to x, this migrant
is recognized as an L-type worker with probability 1), so there is no off
the equilibrium path beliefs to worry about in our model. Moreover, in
all core-periphery equilibria, population in the core region (where the high-
skill workers locate) is larger than the population in the periphery region.
Our model predicts that in core-periphery equilibria the difference in the
populations of different regions increases with the difference between Y H and
Y L.14 The divergent trends in urban and rural populations are confirmed by
data in the U.S. Census Bureau [1990] (Table 1) which shows that in addition
to the increasing difference in urban and rural population, the percentage of
US urban population to total population is increasing over time, and the
percentage of US rural population decreased from 1950 to 1990.
4 Conclusions
Even without any increasing returns to scale in production, our results il-
lustrate that the agglomeration of high-skill labor, and thus the agglomera-
14For example, when α < β and H-type workers agglomerate in x (ρH∗ = 1) in
equilibrium, n∗x − n∗y = (−B +
√A)/(2βnL), where B ≡ √βnL(√αnH + √βnL) and
A ≡ β(nL)2[nH(4s¯(Y H − Y L) + αnH) − 2√α√βnH(2nH + nL) + β(2nH + nL)2]. Since
A − B2 = 4βnH(nL)2[(Y H − Y L)s¯ + (β − √αβ)(nH + nL)] > 0, we have n∗x − n∗y > 0,
∀0 < nH < nL. Furthermore, given nH , nL, β, s¯ > 0, n∗x − n∗y is strictly increasing in
(Y H − Y L). Therefore, these statements are valid even when nH is extremely small rela-
tive to nL.
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tion of high-technology firms, can be caused by asymmetric information and
locational signaling effects, even if regional housing cost (the endogenous
signaling cost) is increasing in the high-skill population residing there.
When workers’ marginal willingness to pay for housing is positively corre-
lated with their productivity, no core-periphery equilibrium can be sustained.
Though there always exists a completely symmetric equilibrium, it is stable
only if the difference between high-skill and low-skill workers’ productivity
is not too large. On the other hand, when workers’ marginal willingness to
pay for housing is negatively correlated with their productivity, there exist
stable core-periphery equilibria. In this case, sorting on skill occurs, which
accounts for the city size wage premium. Therefore, a core-periphery equi-
librium can be present under locational signaling effects to explain the urban
wage premium.
In summary, though the appearance of a core region is not socially op-
timal, the conclusions of this paper shed light on the importance of path-
dependence or policies that attract high-skill labor for the development of
a region, even when there are no increasing returns to scale, knowledge
spillovers, or externalities. Moreover, in any stratified equilibrium, the ag-
glomeration of high-skill labor in one region is mixed with a portion of low-
skill labor. This suggests that when location signals workers’ productivity
and the signaling cost is determined by the housing market at a location,
location can at best be a reference for rather than a guarantee of workers’
high productivity.
From an empirical point of view, firms learn gradually about their work-
ers; see Alo´s-Ferrer and Prat [2012]. Thus, the location signal might be more
valuable for employees fresh out of school than older workers. This leverage
might be exploited to test our model.
The model might be more interesting if applied to firms rather than con-
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sumers. For example, consumers cannot distinguish the quality of food served
by restaurants. A continuum of restaurants might signal their quality, high
or low, to their consumers by where they choose to locate, whereas the sig-
naling cost in this case is the price of renting a commercial space. This is
another example of the type of phenomenon this model can capture.
Many extensions of the ideas presented here come to mind, for example,
adding further heterogeneity to workers and firms, or adding firm investment
in physical capital. The techniques introduced here can be extended to mod-
els where firms have private information, or to models where both firms and
workers have private information.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2
When α < β, productivity and the marginal willingness to pay for housing
are negatively correlated. In the phase diagram, from f ≡ uH∗x − uH∗y and
g ≡ uL∗x − uL∗y , it can be checked that f < 0 (f > 0) for all (ρH , ρL)-points
above (below) the curve ρ˙H = 0. In addition, g < 0 (g > 0) for all (ρH , ρL)-
points above (below) the curve ρ˙L = 0.15 Letting φi(ρH) ≡ {ρL|ui∗x (ρH , ρL) =
ui∗y (ρ
H , ρL)}, i ∈ N , φi(ρH), i ∈ N , is single valued and non-empty for ρH ∈
[0, 1]. The phase diagram shows that a necessary and sufficient condition
for a stable completely symmetric equilibrium is φH
′
(ρH) ≤ φL′(ρH) and
φH
′
(ρH) ≤ 0 at ρH = 1
2
. A sufficient condition for the existence of a core-
periphery equilibrium is φL(ρH) < φH(ρH) at ρH = 1 or φL(ρH) > φH(ρH)
at ρH = 0.
Whether a core-periphery configuration can constitute an equilibrium de-
pends on the relative positions of ρ˙H = 0 and ρ˙L = 0 in the phase diagram.
From
f − g = 4(
√
α−√β)
s¯
(√
α(
1
2
− ρH)nH +
√
β(
1
2
− ρL)nL
)
, (17)
it can be checked that when α < β, f < g if and only if ρL < 1
2
+
√
αnH√
βnL
(1
2
−ρH).
Furthermore,
f =g =
1
Ψ
[4(Y H − Y L)
√
βnH(
√
αnH +
√
βnL)(
1
2
− ρH)]
for ρL =
1
2
+
√
αnH√
βnL
(
1
2
− ρH), ρH ∈ [0, 1], (18)
where Ψ ≡ [(α−2√αβ)(1−2ρH)2−4βρH(1−ρH)](nH)2−βnL(2nH+nL) < 0,
for all ρH ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for ρH < 1
2
, f = g < 0 on ρL = 1
2
+
√
αnH√
βnL
(1
2
−ρH);
and for ρH > 1
2
, f = g > 0 on ρL = 1
2
+
√
αnH√
βnL
(1
2
− ρH). That is, the curves
15It can be proved that ∂f
∂ρL
= −nL( 4
√
αβ
s¯ +
nH(Y H−Y L)
n2x n
2
y
)Φ, and ∂g
∂ρL
= −nL( 4βs¯ +
nH(Y H−Y L)
n2x n
2
y
)Φ, where Φ ≡ (1 − ρH)ρHnH(nH + 2nL) + [ρH + (ρL)2 − 2ρHρL](nL)2 > 0
since [ρH + (ρL)2 − 2ρHρL] > (ρH − ρL)2 > 0.
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ρ˙H = 0 and ρ˙L = 0 are below (above) the line ρL = 1
2
+
√
αnH√
βnL
(1
2
− ρH) for
ρH < 1
2
(ρH > 1
2
). Therefore, for ρH < 1
2
, any point on ρ˙L = 0 must satisfy
both g = 0 and f < g, which implies f < 0; and for ρH > 1
2
, any point on
ρ˙L = 0 satisfies f > 0. Finally, since φL(ρH) ∈ (0, 1), for ρH ∈ {0, 1},16 from
Definition 2 and Lemma 1, there always exist three equilibria at (0, φL(0)),
(1
2
, 1
2
), and (1, φL(1)).
When α > β, since f > g if and only if ρL < 1
2
+
√
αnH√
βnL
(1
2
− ρH) and
g < 0 (g > 0) for all ρL = 1
2
+
√
αnH√
βnL
(1
2
− ρH) where ρH ∈ [0, 1
2
) (ρH ∈ (1
2
, 1]),
it follows that for ρH < 1
2
, any point on ρ˙L = 0 satisfies f > g = 0, and
for ρH > 1
2
, any point on ρ˙L = 0 satisfies f < 0. Therefore, there is no
core-periphery equilibrium, and from Lemma 1, the unique equilibrium is
symmetric.17 Since α > β implies φH
′
(1
2
) < φL
′
(1
2
) and
−∂f/∂ρ
H
∂f/∂ρL
∣∣∣∣
(ρH , ρL)=( 1
2
, 1
2
)
=
(Y H − Y L)s¯− αn2/nL
(Y H − Y L)s¯+√αβ n2/nH , (19)
when α > β, the symmetric equilibrium is stable if and only if Y H ≤ Y L +
αn2
s¯ nL
.
Recalling that φi(ρH) ≡ {ρL|ui∗x (ρH , ρL) = ui∗y (ρH , ρL)}, i ∈ N , let Y H(S)
be the sustain point where a given core-periphery pattern can be sustained,
i.e., Y H(S) ≡ min{Y H |φH(1) ≥ φL(1)}, and let Y H(B) be the break point
where the symmetric equilibrium starts to become unstable, i.e., Y H(B) ≡
max{Y H |φH ′(1
2
) ≤ φL′(1
2
) and φH
′
(1
2
) = 0}. Theorem 2 implies that when
α < β, the sustain point and the break point are both at Y H(S) = Y H(B) =
1. Q.E.D.
16For example, at ρH = 0, the largest φL(ρH) = 12 (1 +
nH
nL
√
α
β ) is achieved when Y
L =
Y H , which is less than 1 for nH < nL and α < β. The smallest φL(ρH) = 1
2β(nL)2
(Λ −√
Λ2 − 32β(nL)2n(βnL − αnH)) > 0 where Λ ≡ 2(√α√β + 2β)nHnL + 6β(nL)2 > 0.
17Though in this case, the curves ρ˙H = 0 and ρ˙L = 0 may intersect the boundaries
of ρL = 0 and ρL = 1 on some ρH ∈ (0, 1), these intersection points cannot constitute
core-periphery equilibria since any point on ρ˙H = 0 for ρH ∈ [0, 12 ) (ρH ∈ ( 12 , 1]) satisfies
g < f = 0 (g > f = 0).
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Year Urban population Rural population The difference in urban
(percent of total) (percent of total) and rural population
1950 96846817 (64.0%) 54478981 (36.0%) 42367836
1960 125268750 (69.9%) 54045425 (30.1%) 71223325
1970 149646617 (73.6%) 53565309 (26.4%) 96081308
1980 167050992 (73.7%) 59494813 (26.3%) 107556179
1990 187053487 (75.2%) 61656386 (24.8%) 125397101
Table 1: Source: U.S. Census Bureau [1990], (CPH-2).
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Figure 1: Households’ demand curves when productivity and the marginal
willingness to pay for housing are negatively correlated, i.e., α < β.
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Figure 2: Households’ demand curves when productivity and the marginal
willingness to pay for housing are positively correlated, i.e., α > β.
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Figure 3: The logic and intuition for the existence of a core-periphery
equilibrium when α < β.
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Figure 4: The logic and intuition for the non-existence of a core-periphery
equilibrium when α > β.
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Figure 5: There are core-periphery equilibria when productivity and the
marginal willingness to pay for housing are negatively correlated, i.e., α < β.
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Figure 6: There is no core-periphery equilibrium when productivity and the
marginal willingness to pay for housing are positively correlated, i.e., α > β.
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